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Abstract. The established knowledge in demography and in the economic research is based 
on the concept of Malthusian stagnation and on the associated concept of the escape from 
the Malthusian trap. These two fundamental concepts were gradually enforced by numerous 
other related postulates all aimed at explaining the mechanism of the historical growth of 
population and of the historical economic growth. Examples of publications based on the 
established knowledge are closely examined. They are used to show why the established 
knowledge is scientifically unacceptable. It is also pointed out that the established 
knowledge is contradicted by data and by their analyses. Interpretations of the historical 
economic growth and of the historical growth of population has to be based on accepting 
hyperbolic growth. However, the discussed examples point to a more serious problem in 
these two fields of research. It is a fundamental systemic problem, the problem associated 
with the way research is conducted. Doctrines, interpretations and declarations used by the 
established knowledge have to be often accepted by faith. Data are either ignored or 
manipulated to support preconceived ideas. Contradicting evidence is methodically 
ignored. To be recognised as science, demographic and economic research has to adhere to 
the scientific rules of investigation. 
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1. Introduction 
wo fields of research, economic growth and the growth of population, which 
might appear to be distinctly different, are in fact closely related for at least 
three reasons. First, there is obviously no economic growth without 
humans. Second, there is a close correlation between economic growth and the 
growth of human population (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016b). Third, in order to understand 
the growth of income per capita, measured by the Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (GDP/cap), it is obviously necessary to study not only the economic growth 
but also the growth of human population. It is inter alia for these reasons, that the 
best source of information about the historical economic growth, compiled by the 
world-renown economist, includes not only the data describing the growth of the 
GDP but also the growth of population (Maddison, 2001; 2010).   
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2. The established knowledge 
The established knowledge in demography and in the economic research 
revolves around two fundamental concepts: the Malthusian stagnation and the 
explosion, which is supposed to have marked a dramatic escape from the 
Malthusian trap. Gradually and by accretion, in the process extending over many 
years, these two fundamental concepts were adorned by various additional 
explanations, speculations and conjectures all adding to the now established 
knowledge based on the scientifically unacceptable doctrines and beliefs.  These 
two fundamental regimes of growth, stagnation and explosion, are described as 
Stage 1 and Stage 2, respectively, in the Demographic Transition Theory (see 
Nielsen, 2016c and references therein). The epoch of stagnation was supposed to 
have lasted for many thousands of years and was allegedly strongly controlled by 
the Malthusian positive checks (Malthus, 1798) generating an unstable stage of 
growth characterised by irregular Malthusian oscillations. The mechanism of 
growth is claimed to have changed dramatically at the time of the alleged 
population explosion when the growth was supposed to have changed from slow to 
fast. The transition from stagnation to explosion is described as the great escape 
from the Malthusian trap.  
We have already demonstrated that the established knowledge is convincingly 
contradicted by the relevant data and by their analyses (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; 
Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 
1993; Lehmeyer, 2004; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001, 2010; Mauritius, 2015; 
McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 
2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h; 2016i; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; 
Statistics Mauritius, 2014; Statistics Sweden, 1999; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994, United Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013; von Hoerner, 
1975; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981). The aim of 
this publication is (1) to outline briefly the origin of the established knowledge, (2) 
to explain why the established knowledge is so strongly established, (3) to explain 
the deceptive evidence in data, which can be used in support of the established 
knowledge, (4) to give a few examples of how strongly the established knowledge 
is established and (5) to explain why the established knowledge as illustrated by 
these examples is scientifically unacceptable. 
 
3. Evidence in data 
Data describing the historical growth of population and the historical economic 
growth are hardly ever analysed. Recently, attempts were made to use some of 
these data (Maddison, 2001) but they were presented in grossly distorted and 
misleading diagrams, which appear to be supporting the established knowledge 
(Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 
2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Data were 
not analysed to learn from them but manipulated to support preconceived ideas. 
Such approach to research is scientifically unacceptable. Data have to be carefully 
and methodically analysed to avoid drawing incorrect conclusions. Their 
superficial examination creates strong impression of stagnation followed by 
explosion but when closely analysed they show that the apparent explosion was 
just the natural continuation of the past hyperbolic growth.    
Global population in 10,000 BC is estimated at only between 1 and 10 million 
(McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Thomlinson, 1975). Now the population of this size can 
be located in just a single city. By AD 1, global population increased to only a few 
hundred million. The estimated values vary between 170 and 400 million (Biraben, 
1980; Durand, 1974; Haub, 1995; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Thomlinson, 1975; 
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United Nations, 1973; 1999). Now, the population of this size or even larger can be 
found in just a single country.    
The first billion of global population was reached around AD 1800 (Biraben, 
1980; Durand, 1974; Haub, 1995; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Thomlinson, 1975; 
United Nations, 1973; 1999) and from that time on the growth was progressing 
exceedingly fast. The origin of Homo Sapiens is usually claimed at around 200,000 
years ago but it might have been even earlier (Weaver, Roseman & Stringer, 2008). 
Thus it took many thousands of years for the world population to increase to one 
billion but after reaching the first billion, the second billion was added in just only 
about 130 years (United Nations, 1999). The process of many hundreds of 
thousands of years was suddenly compressed to just over 100 years. The 
consumption of natural resources and the stress on the environment started to 
increase rapidly. 
If adding one billion in just 130 years sounds too fast, the next billion was 
added in just 29 years, the next in 15 years, the next in 13 years, and the next in 12 
years, increasing the size of global population to 6 billion (US Census Bureau, 
2016). The last billion, which increased global population to 7 billion, was added in 
13 years (US Census Bureau, 2016). We call it the slowing-down growth but 
obviously the slowing down process is still too slow.  
Assuming a medium-intensity growth, the size of the world population is 
projected to increase to 8.39 billion in 2030 and 9.63 billion in 2050 reaching a 
maximum of 10.48 billion around 2080 (Nielsen, 2006). These projections are in 
good agreement with the US Census Bureau (2016) projections of 8.34 billion in 
2030 and 9.41 billion in 2050. It is what we hope for, but the high intensity growth 
could lead to 12.26 billion by the end of the current century (Nielsen, 2006), 
assuming that such a growth can be supported by the availability of natural 
resources.  
Similar surprising pattern of a slow growth in the past and a fast growth in 
recent years is reported for the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (Maddison, 
2001; 2010). The first trillion dollars ($10
12
) of the GDP (expressed in the 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars) was reached in 1870. The next trillion was 
added in just 51 years, the next in 19 years and the next in only 10 years, increasing 
global GDP to $4 trillion in 1950. By 1998, global GDP increased to $34 trillion. 
The latest estimate for 2014 is $91 trillion (World Bank, 2016) and the projected 
value for 2050 is $118 trillion (Nielsen, 2015b).  
Using such numbers, it would be easy to conclude that there was a long epoch 
of stagnation in the past economic growth and in the growth of human population 
and that this stagnation was followed by a sudden explosion. However, such a 
conclusion, which is the corner stone of the established knowledge in demography 
and in the economic research, would be unscientific because impressions can be 
misleading. Scientific research has to be conducted scientifically. If economic and 
demographic research is supposed to be recognised as science they have to adhere 
to the scientific rules of investigation.  
In science, data have to be methodically analysed. This fundamental 
requirement in scientific research appears to have been ignored in economic and 
demographic research. Hasty conclusion about stagnation followed by explosion is 
also clearly incorrect and scientifically unacceptable because over 50 years ago, 
von Foerster, Mora & Amiot (1960) demonstrated that the growth of population 
during the AD era was hyperbolic. This crucial contribution to science should not 
have been ignored. It should have been further investigated because hyperbolic 
growth rules out the interpretations based on the assumption of stagnation followed 
by explosion.  
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Postulates of the established knowledge are also unacceptable because 
hyperbolic growth have been recognised and confirmed by other independent 
investigations (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 
2002; von Hoerner, 1975). Accepting the fundamental postulates of established 
knowledge is scientifically unjustified because for a long time now there was a 
large body of data describing the growth of population not only during the AD era 
but also during the BC era (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; 
Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & 
Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 
2013). These data should have been analysed to check the earlier claims about the 
hyperbolic growth.  
Fundamental postulates of the established knowledge are now contradicted by 
the excellent new data describing economic growth and the growth of population 
(Maddison, 2001; 2010). These postulates are scientifically unacceptable because 
they are consistently contradicted by the analysis of relevant data (Nielsen, 2013a; 
2013b; 2013c; 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 
2016h; 2016i).  
Data describing birth and death rates and the associated growth of population 
are limited (Lehmeyer, 2004; Mauritius, 2015; Statistics Mauritius, 2014; Statistics 
Sweden, 1999; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981) but they also show consistently that the 
established knowledge, as expressed in the Demographic Transition Theory, is 
contradicted by their analysis (Nielsen, 2016c). We do not even have to analyse 
these data mathematically to see that they are in contradiction of the established 
knowledge because even though the birth and death rates and the associated growth 
rates were fluctuating, their time-dependence does not fit into the patterns claimed 
by the Demographic Transition Theory. Furthermore, the corresponding 
distributions describing the growth of population do not display any form of 
stagnation during the alleged Stage 1 or a transition to the alleged Stage 2, which is 
supposed to represent the explosion. Data show no such patterns.   
Demographic Transition Theory is based on a persistent and blatant disregard 
for relevant data. This theory is supported by largely meaningless presentations of 
data for birth or death rates. These rates have to be studied together and they 
should show the expected behaviour, as claimed by the Demographic Transition 
Theory, that the gap between them is approximately zero during the alleged Stage 1 
and that it increases during the alleged Stage 2. Such patterns are not confirmed by 
the best available data (Lehmeyer, 2004; Mauritius, 2015; Statistics Mauritius, 
2014; Statistics Sweden, 1999; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981), which show that the 
Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data describing birth and 
death rates and by the associated data describing the growth of population. 
Paradoxically, when methodically analysed, data used in support of the 
Demographic Transition Theory are in fact in its clear contradiction.   
A theory contradicted by just a single set of data is scientifically unacceptable 
and the Demographic Transition Theory was first contradicted by the results of von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot (1960) who demonstrated that the growth of human 
population during the AD era was hyperbolic and thus that Stages 1 and 2 claimed 
by this theory did not exist. The Demographic Transition Theory should have been 
rejected or at least fundamentally modified over 50 years ago. Its continuing use 
over such a long time has been scientifically unjustified. 
Postulates of Malthusian stagnation followed by explosion, and all other 
associated postulates and explanations of the historical economic growth and of the 
historical growth of population followed by a mythical escape from the Malthusian 
trap have no place in science. They may, however, have a place in the history of 
science.   
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4. Hyperbolic growth 
Hyperbolic distributions are strongly deceptive and it is easy to make a mistake 
with their interpretation. Fortunately, however, analysis of hyperbolic distributions 
is also trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014) and it is easy to avoid making an easy 
mistake.  
Examples of two hyperbolic distributions, a hyperbolic distribution describing 
the growth of the world population during the AD era and the distribution 
describing the world economic growth, are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Their 
analysis is based on using the method of reciprocal values (Nielsen, 2014). For a 
sufficiently wide range of data, hyperbolic distributions can be uniquely identified 
using this method because if the reciprocal values are decreasing linearly, then the 
growth is hyperbolic. There is no other option. It is something similar to the unique 
identification of the exponential growth. For a sufficiently large range of good 
quality data, exponential growth can be uniquely identified by the linear 
distribution of the logarithm of the size of a growing entity.  
Figures 1 and 2 show that the growth of human population and economic 
growth were indeed slow over a long time, but it was hyperbolic growth, which is 
slow over a long time and fast over a short time. It is still the same, monotonically-
increasing, growth. It is impossible to divide such a growth into distinctly-different 
components and the best way to see it, is to examine the reciprocal values of the 
size of the growing entity, in our case the reciprocal values of the GDP or of the 
size of the population (Nielsen, 2014).  
 
Figure 1. Data describing the growth of the world population (Maddison, 2010) are 
compared with hyperbolic distribution. 
 
Hyperbolic distributions have to be analysed and interpreted as a whole. The 
same mechanism has to be applied to the slow and fast growth. If we apply the 
mechanism of Malthusian stagnation to the slow growth, we have to apply 
precisely the same mechanism to the fast growth. If we apply the mechanism of 
explosion to the fast growth, then precisely the same mechanism should be applied 
to the slow growth, which obviously is incorrect because explosion has to be 
triggered by something and there was clearly no explosion along the slow growth.  
The usually assumed event that was supposed to have triggered population 
explosion or a sudden takeoff in economic growth or in the growth of population is 
the Industrial Revolution but as we can see in Figures 1 and 2, there was no sudden 
explosion during the Industrial Revolution or at any other time. The growth was 
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increasing monotonically. Transition from slow to fast growth takes place all the 
time. We could demonstrate this monotonic growth even more clearly by using 
reciprocal values of data or by the semilogarithmic display (Nielsen, 2014; 2016a; 
2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h; 2016i) but the primary aim of 
presenting these two diagrams is to illustrate the deceptive character of hyperbolic 
distributions. They can easily lead to incorrect interpretations particularly when 
they are not analysed but only used to quote certain, well-selected numbers or 
when they are deliberately manipulated and distorted (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a; 
2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & 
Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) to support preconceived ideas. Hyperbolic 
distributions have to be analysed.  
 
Figure 2. Data describing the growth of the world Gross Domestic Product (Maddison, 
2010) are compared with hyperbolic distribution. 
 
Figure 1 shows also that the growth of population is not yet levelling off. It is 
still following closely the fast-increasing historical hyperbolic distribution. 
Maddison‘s data end in 2008. The point representing the size of the population in 
2014 is from the US Bureau of Census (2016) while the last two points are the 
predicted values (Nielsen, 2006). Not until 2030 or maybe even until 2050 could 
we expect a clear departure from the historical hyperbolic trend. The future of the 
population growth is uncertain, in much the same way as the future of the world 
economic growth (Nielsen, 2015b). 
 
5. The origin of the concept of stagnation 
Two features make the concept of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation 
deceptively attractive: (1) it is strongly believable and (2) it is supposed to have 
originated over 200 years ago. It is believable because the growth of human 
population and the economic growth over thousands of years were indeed slow, so 
slow that they appear to have been stagnant. It is also an old concept because its 
origin is traced, to Malthus (1798), perhaps inaccurately because Malthus never 
used the word stagnation in his book.  
The Malthusian theory, as was outlined initially by Malthus (1978), captures 
the main attributes of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that had 
characterized most of human existence… (Galor, 2005, p. 221). 
The idea of multiple equilibria, or poverty traps, can be retraced back to 
Malthus (Wang, 2005, p. 36).  
The work of Malthus was the first well-documented attempt to understand and 
explain the mechanism of growth of human population but it appears that this is 
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also precisely where it ended. Considering the time when Malthus was writing his 
book, it was a remarkable achievement, but his work should have been not only 
checked but also extended using a large body of data, which were not available to 
Malthus but which are readily available to us. 
The history of population theory can be summarized in three words: pre-
Malthusian, Malthusian, and post-Malthusian. Hardly ever in intellectual 
history does one man so dominate a field as does the Reverend Thomas 
Robert Malthus in demographic theory. To paraphrase a quotation attributed 
to Newton, Malthus‘ shoulders must be climbed (Thomlinson, 1965, p. 47. 
Italics in the original text.). 
 …the demographic transition experiences three regimes: the ‗Malthusian 
Regime,‘ the ‗Post-Malthusian Regime,‘ and the ‗Modern Growth Regime.‘ 
Any theory attempts (sic) to describe the process of demographic transition 
must include these three periods (Wang, 2005, p. 3. Italics added.).  
Claiming, suggesting or assuming that something must be accepted just because 
it comes from a certain source is not acceptable in science. Any theory can be 
questioned and even should be questioned, and if necessarily corrected or rejected. 
The sooner it is done, the better it is for science. If Malthus‘s shoulders must be 
climbed it is only for the same reason as climbing the shoulders of any giant of 
human intellect: to see better and further ahead. It is not just to have a comfortable 
ride. 
However, we are not even climbing Malthus‘s shoulders. Attaching his name to 
the concept of stagnation and calling it Malthusian stagnation sounds like 
defamation. It is questionable whether Malthus would be pleased with such a 
dubious distinction. We are putting our interpretation into his work and we are 
claiming that he did it.  
If we read his publication carefully, we can find that he was writing not only 
about the devastating effects of positive checks but also about their regenerating 
effects (Nielsen, 2013b). Given enough time he would have probably studied this 
issue further. Descriptions of destructive effects of positive checks, which we label 
rather inaccurately as Malthusian stagnation should be balanced by descriptions of 
regeneration, which Malthus mentions in his book.  
The name ―Malthusian stagnation‖ is a misnomer because Malthus never 
claimed that positive checks would produce prolonged and wide-spread stagnations 
in the growth of population and because we know now that Malthusian positive 
checks, even if present, were not producing such effects (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 
1993; Nielsen, 2013a; 2014; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 
1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). They appear 
to have been generally either too weak or their destructive impacts were effectively 
compensated by the well-known, natural process of regeneration (Nielsen, 2013a; 
2013b; 2013c).  
It would be interesting to search for impacts of Malthusian positive checks on 
the growth of population by investigating the growth of local populations. 
Generally, there appears to have been no impact. The only known example 
(Nielsen, 2016d) is a minor distortion in the growth of the world population 
between AD 1200 and 1400, which appears to be correlated with the convergence 
of five major demographic catastrophes:  Mongolian Conquest (1260-1295) with 
the total estimated death toll of 40 million; Great European Famine (1315-1318), 
7.5 million; the 15-year Famine in China (1333-1348), 9 million; Black Death 
(1343-1352), 25 million; and the Fall of Yuan Dynasty (1351-1369), 7.5 million. In 
general, demographic catastrophes were too weak to disturb the growth of global 
population (Nielsen, 2013c).  
Looking for convincing evidence of impacts of Malthusian positive checks on 
the growth of population would not be easy because we would have to demonstrate 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 3(3), R.W. Nielsen, p.429-457. 
436 
not only clear discontinuities in the growth of population but also that these 
discontinuities are correlated with the records of demographic catastrophes. We 
would have to know the intensity of these demographic catastrophes not just in the 
number of deaths but in their relative impact. However, even then we would have 
to be aware of the possibility of spurious correlations.  
Malthus never claimed that his concepts must be accepted. On the contrary, he 
was open to new ideas. Referring to himself in the third person he wrote: 
If he should succeed in drawing the attention of more able men to what he 
conceives to be the principal difficulty in the way to the improvement of 
society and should, in consequence, see this difficulty removed, even in 
theory, he will gladly retract his present opinions and rejoice in a conviction 
of his error (Malthus, 1798, p. viii. Italics added.) 
It is interesting that Malthus used arithmetic and geometric progressions to 
support his arguments but it is not certain whether he was familiar with the 
hyperbolic growth, let alone that he appreciated the difference between hyperbolic 
and exponential (geometric) types of growth. Even now, hyperbolic distributions 
are repeatedly misinterpreted and exponential growth is used to explain the growth 
of just about anything. 
Malthus claimed that ―Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical 
ratio‖ (Malthus, 1978, p. 4). Now we know that this is not true. Population, when 
unchecked does not increase in a geometrical ratio (exponentially) but 
hyperbolically (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d; Podlazov, 
2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 
1960).  
Malthus did not base his claims on a rigorous analysis of data. If he lived long 
enough to have better data, he would have probably discovered that the growth of 
population is not characterised by a constant doubling time and consequently that it 
could not have been increasing exponentially. If he were familiar with hyperbolic 
growth, he would have probably discovered that population increases 
hyperbolically. However, Malthus did not live long enough, he did not have access 
to good data and he was probably unfamiliar with hyperbolic growth. Those who 
lived after him and those who live now are more privileged.  
 
6. Examples of questionable claims 
6.1. The alleged Law of Population 
During the alleged but non-existent epoch of Malthusian stagnation, birth rates 
are claimed to have been high because new generations were needed to support 
many tiresome and mundane activities such as hunting, gathering, cultivating 
crops, caring for children and generally for coping with harsh living conditions.  
According to Classical economists, and early Neo-Classical economists as 
well, population size was determined by the demand for labor. This was the 
Law of Population which constantly operated behind the seemingly random 
variations in fertility and mortality induced by epidemic, famine, and war 
(Lee, 1997, p. 1063). 
Claims: 
1. Population size was determined by the demand for labour. 
2. This is the Law of Growth. 
3. This law has been accepted by Classical and early Neo-Classical economists. 
4. There were seemingly random variations in fertility and mortality. 
5. Random variations were caused by epidemics, famine and war. 
6. This law operated constantly behind these seemingly random variations.    
It is interesting how much is claimed in this single paragraph and it does not 
matter whether Lee agrees with all these claims or just describes them. This 
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quotation represents a typical set of questionable claims often encountered in 
publications related to the concept of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation. Can we 
prove them or do we have to accept them by faith? 
To prove this ―Law of Population‖ we would have to have data about the 
demand for labour and about the growth of population extending over thousands of 
years, and we would have to prove that there is a correlation between the demand 
for labour and the size of human population. We would have to prove that 
population size was determined by the demand for labour. We cannot prove it 
because we do not have such data, but we can show that the population data 
(Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d) do not display any features that could be linked with this 
alleged ―Law of Population.‖ This law has to be accepted by faith but this law is 
also in contradiction with data and with their analysis. 
It is easy to imagine and claim, without a proof, that there were random 
variations in the fertility and mortality. It would be probably more difficult to 
expect that there were no variations but we have no information about these 
variations. We can only imagine them but we cannot analyse them.  
We have reliable data about the size of human population (Biraben, 1980; 
Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 
1997; Maddison, 2001; 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013) over 
thousands of years but we have no matching data for fertility and mortality (birth 
rates and death rates). We also have no matching data about epidemics, famines 
and wars to study how they were correlated with ―random variations in fertility and 
mortality.‖ We have absolutely no way of proving that ―the Law of Population‖ 
―constantly operated behind the seemingly random variations in fertility and 
mortality induced by epidemic, famine, and war.‖ This claim is unscientific 
because we can never expect to verify it by data but also it is scientifically 
unacceptable because data and their analysis give no support for such declarations.  
It should be also noted that growth of population is not determined directly by 
birth and death rates but by the difference between these two quantities. This 
difference determines the growth rate. More precisely, it determines the rate of 
natural increase but generally migrations rates are relatively small and 
consequently the difference between birth and death rates can be taken as 
determining the growth rate.  
A constant (non-zero) difference (constant growth rate) produces exponential 
growth. A zero difference produces constant population. However, variable 
difference between birth and death rates (i.e. the variable growth rate) does not 
necessarily produce a variable size of the population. In fact, even large 
fluctuations in the growth rate are not readily reflected in the growth of population. 
They might be reflected only as small and negligible variations (Nielsen, 2016c).  
Fluctuations in birth and death rates have no impact on the mechanism of 
growth because they do not change population growth trajectories. We can see it 
even without analysing data. We can easily check that even for data characterised 
by large fluctuations in birth and death rates, and consequently by large 
fluctuations in the growth rate, the corresponding data, which describe the growth 
of population are not affected by such fluctuations. Fluctuations in birth and death 
rates do not change the general character of the distributions describing the growth 
of population (Lehmeyer, 2004; Mauritius, 2015; Statistics Mauritius, 2014; 
Statistics Sweden, 1999; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981). These data are well known. 
Some of them are even repeatedly used to defend the erroneous Demographic 
Transition Theory but no-one cared to check the population data published in the 
same sources, which list the fluctuating birth and death rates. While the fluctuating 
birth and death rates are taken as the confirmation of the established knowledge, 
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the data describing the growth of population, data coming from precisely the same 
sources as the data for birth and death rates, are methodically ignored. Data 
describing the growth of population are in contradiction of the Demographic 
Transition Theory and in contradiction of the established knowledge.  
6.2. The alleged losing battle 
According to the concept of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation, as soon as the 
population started to increase, it was significantly reduced by numerous factors 
associated with severe living conditions.   
During the first [stage of the demographic transition], fertility is assumed to 
have been sufficiently high to allow a population to grow slowly even in the 
face of a rather high level of mortality. However, periodic epidemics of 
plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases would in one or two 
years wipe out the gains made over decades. Over long periods of time there 
would, consequently, be almost no population growth at all (van de Kaa, 
2010, p. 87. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. During the first stage of the demographic transition, fertility and mortality 
are assumed to have been high. 
2. Population was growing slowly. 
3. Population growth was strongly controlled by periodic epidemics of plague, 
cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases. 
4. Periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases 
would in one or two years wipe out the gains made over decades. 
5. Over long periods of time there was no population growth at all. 
Van de Kaa describes the first of the four stages of growth claimed by the 
classical Demographic Transition Theory, the stage corresponding to the mythical 
but non-existent epoch of Malthusian stagnation (Nielsen 2016b; 2016c; 2016d).  
Here we have a vivid description of what was happening so long ago and over a 
long time; not only a vivid description but also an explanation. In science, one 
would have to do a lot of solid work in order to be able to make such a sweeping 
declaration. We would have to prove that our conclusions are supported by data. 
We would have to give frequent examples that the growth of population was 
indeed controlled by ―periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other 
infectious diseases.‖ We would have to demonstrate convincingly that there were 
frequent correlations between ―periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and 
other infectious diseases‖ and the growth of population. Ideally, we would also 
have to prove that these frequent irregularities were caused by ―periodic epidemics 
of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases‖ because even observed 
correlations could be spurious.  
Van de Kaa produces no such proof. He does not even give reference to such 
research. As far as we can tell, no-one has ever carried out such systematic and 
well-documented research.  
His claims have to be accepted by faith and even more importantly, by a fixated 
faith because they are contradicted by data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; 
Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; 
Maddison, 2001; 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013). With only 
one exception in the past 12,000 years, between AD 1200 and 1400 (Nielsen, 
2016d), there is no convincing evidence of generally occurring ―long periods of 
time‖ when there was ―almost no population growth at all‖ and that the growth was 
controlled by ―periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious 
diseases.‖ The only way we could hope to give support to his claims would be to 
find exceptions to the generally observed regularities in the growth of population 
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but even then his claims would not have a general application. The established 
knowledge may sound plausible and convincing but it has to be accepted by faith.   
It is scientifically incorrect to take an easy way out by assuming that something 
happened, which we think could have happened and claim with such absolute 
certainty that it did happen. We might feel or think that our descriptions are true; 
we might wish for them to be true, but we should test them by following the 
generally accepted process of scientific investigation.  
6.3. The alleged food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium 
Harsh living conditions, and in particular the availability of food, are supposed 
to have a suppressive influence on the growth of human population but these 
intuitive expectations are again contradicted by data (UNDP, 2011) showing that 
growth rate is not directly proportional to the level of affluence but to the level of 
deprivation (Nielsen, 2013b). There is also convincing evidence that harsh living 
conditions in the distant past did not shape the growth of population (Nielsen, 
2016b; 2016d; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). Again, it is scientifically 
inexcusable to take an easy way out, ignore data and try to mould science in the 
image of our wished-for interpretations.   
…the food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since time 
immemorial (Komlos, 2000, p. 320).  
…the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism resulting from 
the conflict between the population's natural tendency to increase and the 
limitations imposed by the availability of food (Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985, p. 
24). 
Claims: 
1. There was a food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium. 
2. This equilibrium prevailed since time immemorial. 
3. Population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism. 
4. Oscillations are caused by the natural tendency of the population to increase 
and by the limitations imposed by the availability of food. 
It is easy to assume that ―the food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had 
prevailed since time immemorial‖ but it is more difficult to prove it. It is easy to 
claim that ―the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism resulting 
from the conflict between the population's natural tendency to increase and the 
limitations imposed by the availability of food‖ but it is more difficult to prove it.  
Authors of these confident declarations do not prove anything nor do they give 
reference to such a proof because such a proof does not exist. These declarations 
are in harmony with the established knowledge but the established knowledge is in 
conflict with science (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, Mora & 
Amiot, 1960). 
In order to have these declarations supported by science we would have to work 
a little harder. We would have to design a model with the homeostatic equilibrium. 
We would have to have data for the availability of food ―since time immemorial.‖ 
We would have to have corresponding data describing the growth of population. 
These data would have to be at small time intervals in order to detect the postulated 
oscillations. We would have to demonstrate convincingly that there were 
oscillations in the growth of population and that there was a correlation between 
the recorded oscillations in the growth of population and the oscillations in the 
availability of food. We would have to prove that the oscillations in the growth of 
population were caused by the oscillations in the availability of food. Acceptable 
evidence would have to be in demonstrating that our mathematical model 
reproduces all these oscillations. This would have been science but what we are 
offered is just a story, which has to be accepted by faith. 
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It is easy to claim many things but it is more difficult to prove them. Our 
postulates and explanations might sound plausible but they would have to be 
verified by the rigorous process of scientific investigation. Data (Biraben, 1980; 
Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 
1997; Maddison, 2001; 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013) give no 
support for the existence of the claimed fluctuations or oscillations.  
There is no scientific basis for claiming that ―food-controlled homeostatic 
equilibrium had prevailed since time immemorial.‖ This claim has to be accepted 
by faith. We have to accept by faith that ―population tends to oscillate in a 
homeostatic mechanism resulting from the conflict between the population's 
natural tendency to increase and the limitations imposed by the availability of 
food.‖ It all might sound plausible but we cannot prove it. However, even if it 
sounds plausible it is contradicted by the rigorous analysis of data (Nielsen, 2016b; 
2015d). 
Artzrouni & Komlos (1985) carried out model calculations, which incorporated 
the assumed mechanism of Malthusian stagnation. Their contribution is important 
but for reasons, which were not even noticed in their publication because their 
results show that the mechanism of Malthusian stagnation does not work. We shall 
discuss this issue in one of our forthcoming publications.    
6.4. The allegedly characteristic features of the past human history 
Stage 1 [of the Demographic Transition Theory] presumably characterizing 
most of human history, involves high and relatively equal birth and death 
rates and little resulting population growth‖ (Guest & Almgren, 2001; p. 621. 
Italics added.).  
This stage is characterized not by changes in average death rates but by a 
stagnation of death rates at extremely high levels for a period of what is 
believed to be thousands of years‖ (Olshansky & Ault, 1986, p. 357. Italics 
added.). 
Claims: 
1. Stage 1 proposed by the Demographic Transition Theory characterised 
presumably most of human history. 
2. During this stage there were high and relatively equal birth and death rates. 
3. During this stage there was little resulting population growth. 
4. This stage was not characterised by changes in the average death rates. 
5. This stage was characterised by stagnation of death rates at extremely high 
levels. 
6. This stagnation is believed to have lasted for thousands of years. 
It is amazing how firmly the established knowledge is now established if so 
much can be so easily claimed. The declaration that Stage 1 proposed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory was ―characterized not by changes in average 
death rates but by a stagnation of death rates at extremely high levels for a period 
of what is believed to be thousands of years‖ has to be accepted by faith and by 
faith alone because we can never expect to have systematic data describing death 
rates to check its validity. No-one has yet demonstrated the validity of the 
Demographic Transition Theory. No-one has yet demonstrated the existence of the 
first two stages of growth, let alone the existence of all stages of growth.  
Examples used in support of the Demographic Transition Theory are in fact in 
its direct contradiction (Nielsen, 2016c). As pointed out earlier (Nielsen, 2016c), 
the only way to demonstrate the apparent empirical features, which seem to be in 
agreement with the Demographic Transition Theory, is by a suitable manipulation 
of data consisting in stitching together the birth and death rates data for Mauritius 
with the data for Sweden.  
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It should be also remembered that any scientific theory is acceptable only if it is 
consistently confirmed by empirical evidence. A single convincingly contradicting 
evidence questions the validity of an accepted theory. For the Demographic 
Transition Theory, it is the other way round. There is not a single convincing 
empirical evidence in support of this theory but there is overwhelming empirical 
evidence showing that this theory is incorrect. This theory is contradicted by birth 
and death rates and by the corresponding distributions describing the growth of 
population (Nielsen, 2016c). Furthermore, within the range of analysable data 
(Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; 
Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001; 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & 
Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 
2013) growth of population was hyperbolic (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 
2016b; 2016d; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). Stages of growth proposed by the Demographic 
Transition Theory did not exist.  
Birth and death rates may have been high and strongly fluctuating but high and 
fluctuating birth and death rates do not prove the existence of a stagnant state of 
growth because, as mentioned earlier, growth is determined by the average 
difference between these two quantities. Furthermore, these two quantities have to 
behave in a very specific way to produce the stagnant state of growth. Studying just 
death rates or birth rates, or equivalently studying just the fertility rates (Lehr, 
2009) cannot be used as the evidence in support of the Demographic Transition 
Theory. Using scraps of favourable information while ignoring contradicting 
evidence is strongly misleading and consequently scientifically unacceptable. 
6.5. The allegedly well-documented evidence 
It is well documented that the fluctuations experienced by the world‘s 
population throughout history did not have a regular, cyclical pattern, but 
were, to a large extent, brought about by randomly determined demographic 
crises (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.). As McKeown and others have pointed 
out, the main cause of these fluctuations of the past were mortality crises. 
There are four kinds of crises: subsistence crises, epidemic crises, combined 
crises (subsistence/epidemic), and finally crises from other causes, which are 
mainly exogenous (wars, natural or other catastrophes) 
Crises followed by periods of population decline during which the nutritional 
status of the population improved gave rise to fluctuations which testify to 
the continued existence of the ‗Malthusian trap‘: population would not grow 
beyond its carrying capacity for long, and when it did, the resulting overshoot 
was followed by a ‗crash‘ (i.e. the positive checks such as diseases, famines, 
wars, etc.) (Artzrouni & Komlos 1985, p. 24. Italics added.). 
Claims: 
1. There were fluctuations in the world‘s population throughout history. 
2. These fluctuations are well documented. 
3. It is well documented that these fluctuations did not have a cyclic pattern. 
4. It is well documented that these fluctuations were, to a large extent, brought 
about by randomly determined demographic crises (wars, famines, 
epidemics, etc.). 
5. The main cause of these fluctuations were mortality crises. 
6. There are four types of crises. 
7. Crises were followed by periods of population decline. 
8. Population decline improved nutritional status. 
9. Fluctuations testify to the continuing existence of the Malthusian trap. 
10. Population was repeatedly reaching its carrying capacity. 
11. Population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long.  
12. Population growing beyond its carrying capacity was reflected in overshoots. 
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13. Overshoots were followed by crashes.  
If all this is so well documented, where is the documentation of this well 
documented research? It would be interesting to see at least a few references to this 
important and fundamental research work, to see the data showing fluctuations 
―throughout history,‖ to see a positive proof that the ―the fluctuations experienced 
by the world‘s population throughout history‖ are correlated with ―demographic 
crises (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.),‖ that they were ―brought about by randomly 
determined demographic crises.‖ It would be also interesting to see convincing 
evidence that population was reaching its carrying capacity, that ―population would 
not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long,‖ the convincing evidence of 
overshoots and crashes, evidence that crashes were associated with ―positive 
checks such as diseases, famines, wars, etc.‖ It would be interesting to see the 
compelling evidence of the existence of the Malthusian trap, the demonstration of 
frequent ―periods of population decline,‖ the compelling proof that periods of 
population decline caused by demographic crises were improving nutritional status. 
All this vital and ―well documented‖ evidence is missing.  
What is well documented is the repeated fiction stories, which have to be 
accepted by faith. We have many publications propagating such stories. The 
repeatedly related stories of fiction are by now accepted as the undisputable facts. 
What is well documented is a system of beliefs, doctrines, wished-for explanations, 
opinions, views, theories, hypotheses, conjectures and speculations, added 
gradually over a long time until they became the established knowledge, the ―well-
documented‖ established knowledge but the knowledge, which is contradicted by 
science.  
In contrast, it is well documented (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; 
Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001; 
2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; 
Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013) that the growth of human 
population does not show fluctuations or random behaviour. It is well documented 
that the data show no signs of frequent overshoots and crashes, no signs of growth 
reaching its carrying capacity, no signs of the ―continued existence of the 
‗Malthusian trap‘,‖ no evidence that the ―population would not grow beyond its 
carrying capacity for long,‖ and no repeated ―periods of population decline.‖ All 
these colourful and dramatic descriptions associated with the narrative based on the 
assumption of the existence of the mythical epoch of Malthusian stagnation are 
contradicted by data.  
It is obvious, that demographic crises were often causing decline in the size of 
local populations, depending on the scale of these crises and depending on what we 
understand by a local crisis. Sometimes it might have been just a large death toll in 
a city, in a part of a country, as for instance in China (Mallory, 1926), or maybe in 
the whole country or even extending over a few countries. However, a large death 
toll does not necessarily mean a significant impact on the growth of human 
population. A large death toll should not be immediately interpreted as a 
population decline; it could have been just a slower growth over a limited time 
followed by a more intensified growth, as it happened after AD 1400 for the world 
population.  
All these issues should be closely investigated by examining records of 
demographic catastrophes. To arrive at any reasonably supported conclusion, we 
would have to do some hard work. However, data which should be used for such 
investigations are strongly limited. We have no data showing that local 
demographic crises were repeatedly causing fluctuations in the growth of regional 
or global populations. In fact, the data show remarkably stable growth of human 
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population, generally unaffected by demographic crises (Nielsen, 2013a; 2013c; 
2016b; 2016d). 
The opening paragraph in the above quotation contains two interesting and 
characteristic elements, the elements occurring repeatedly in the descriptions of the 
concept of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation: (1) it makes a highly-questionable 
but confident declaration about the existence of certain features (in this case about 
the existence of fluctuations) and (2) it equally confidently explains them while 
ignoring empirical evidence. The normal progression in scientific research is first 
to observe certain features and then try to explain them. We can also reverse the 
process: we can first predict the existence of certain features. However, to accept 
the prediction and the associated explanation, we would have to demonstrate the 
existence of the predicted features. This is how science works but for doctrines 
accepted by faith scientific process of investigation is too tedious and consequently 
it is readily ignored. 
So in this case, we would have to show first that there were significant 
fluctuations in the birth and death rates and in the size of human population 
extending over thousands of years, and then we would also have to explain them 
convincingly by demonstrating that they were correlated with demographic crises. 
Alternatively, we would have to predict (using a suitable mathematical model) the 
existence of fluctuations in birth and death rates and in the size of human 
population and then we would have to show that our predictions are confirmed by 
relevant data.    
We cannot prove that there were fluctuations ―throughout history‖ in the birth 
and death rates because we do not have relevant data, but we can prove that there 
were no fluctuations ―throughout history‖ in the size of human population because 
we have the relevant data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; 
Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001; 2010; McEvedy & 
Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United 
Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013). There is nothing in the data, which calls for the 
explanations of fluctuations in the growth of population because there are no 
fluctuations. What needs to be explained is perhaps the remarkable absence of 
fluctuations, the absence of random behaviour, crashes, overshoots or ―periods of 
population decline.‖ What needs to be explained is why the growth of population 
was so remarkably stable during the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016d) and why it 
was hyperbolic. The quoted declarations are in perfect agreement with the 
established knowledge but they are in conflict with science.  
6.6. The allegedly long-run equilibrium between population size and the 
food supply 
Referring to three sources (Habakkuk, 1953; Kunitz, 1983; McKeown, 1983), 
Komlos explains:  
Malthusian positive checks (mortality crises) maintained a long-run 
equilibrium between population size and the food supply. Crises followed by 
periods when human nutritional status was above the level of subsistence 
gave rise to cycles. …the cycles testify to the continued existence of the 
‘Malthusian population trap’: population could not grow beyond an upper 
bound imposed by the resource and capital constraints of the economic 
structure in which it was imbedded. The ‘escape’ from this trap occurred 
only when the aggregate capital stock was large enough and grew fast enough 
to provide additional sustenance for the population, which thereby overcame 
the effects of the diminishing returns that had hindered human progress 
during the previous millennia. After escaping from the Malthusian trap, 
population was able to grow unchecked.  In historic terms, this escape 
corresponds to the industrial and demographic revolutions. Removal of the 
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nutritional constraint, at least for the developed part of the world, resulted in 
the population explosion (Komlos, 1989, pp. 194, 195. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. There was a long-term equilibrium between population size and the food 
supply. 
2. This equilibrium was maintained by positive checks (mortality crises). 
3. Crises were followed by periods when human nutritional status was above 
the level of subsistence. 
4. This process gave rise to cycles. 
5. The cycles testify to the continued existence of the ‗Malthusian population 
trap‘. 
6. Population could not grow beyond an upper bound imposed by the resource 
and capital constraints of the economic structure in which it was imbedded. 
7. Malthusian trap was active for millennia. 
8. The escape from the Malthusian trap occurred when the aggregate capital 
stock was large enough and grew fast enough to provide additional 
sustenance for the population. 
9. The removal of nutritional constrains caused population explosion. 
Massive amount of work would have to be done to support all these impressive 
declarations. We would have to study food supply over millennia and determine 
how they were correlated with the growth of human population. We would have to 
prove that there was ―a long-run equilibrium between population size and the food 
supply.‖ We would have to study mortality crises over millennia. We would have 
to establish a correlation between the growth of human population, food supply and 
mortality crises. We would also have to investigate upper bounds of ―resource and 
capital constraints‖ and prove that over millennia the size of the population was 
repeatedly reaching the limits of these upper bounds. 
Conducting scientific research is not easy but results have a high degree of 
reliability. Writing fictions stories, whose general script is already provided by the 
established knowledge based largely on faith is much easier, but this is not science.   
It is easy to declare so much so quickly and with such a confidence, but it is 
harder to prove it. It is also hard to accept it, but accept we must if we want to 
accept the concept of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation promoted by the 
established knowledge.     
The claimed cycles cannot possibly testify to ―the continued existence of the 
‗Malthusian population trap‘‖ because they did not exist in the growth of 
population (Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). 
Population growth, global and regional, was remarkably stable and unconstrained. 
The claim that ―population could not grow beyond an upper bound imposed by the 
resource and capital constraints‖ is contradicted by the analysis of population data. 
This claim appears to be based on pure fantasy and on a wished-for mechanism that 
did not exist. There was no Malthusian trap in the growth of population.  
We know nothing about any possible cycles in birth and death rates because we 
have no relevant data extending over a long time in the past. We do not know how 
large were these alleged cycles. We do not even know whether they existed. 
Discussions of these cycles are irrelevant because we know that cycles in birth and 
death rates are of little or no consequence for explaining the mechanism of growth 
(Nielsen, 2016c). Even if they were present they did not have any significant 
influence on the growth of the world population in the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 
2016d). They also had no influence on the growth of regional populations (Nielsen, 
2016b). The absence of cycles in the growth of population combined with the 
evidence of the steadily increasing growth testify that the Malthusian trap did not 
exist. We cannot also claim that there was ―‗escape‘ from this trap‖ because there 
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was no trap in the growth of population. There was also no trap in the economic 
growth (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h; 2016i). Again, 
the quoted declarations are in perfect agreement with the established knowledge 
but they are in conflict with science. 
6.7. The alleged fluctuation of fertility and mortality rates around zero 
Discussing the first stage of the Demographic Transition Theory, Warf explains:  
Because both fertility and mortality rates are high, the difference between 
them — natural population growth — is relatively low, fluctuating around 
zero‖ (Warf, 2010, p. 708. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. During the first stage of the demographic transition fertility and mortality 
rates were high. 
2. The difference between them (the natural population growth) was fluctuating 
around zero because they were high. 
Just because fertility and mortality rates were high it does not follow that the 
difference between them was zero. The difference between them can fluctuate 
around zero even if they are low. However, this is just a minor issue. 
In this quotation the ―natural population growth‖ is identified as the difference 
between the fertility and mortality rates. It is, therefore, the rate of natural increase 
or the growth rate because, in general, migration rates are relatively small and can 
be neglected.  
We shall recall that while the growth rate fluctuating around a constant value 
describes exponential growth, the growth rate ―fluctuating around zero‘ describes 
the constant size of the growing entity, i.e. in our case, the constant size of the 
population. The claim made by Warf is contradicted by data, which show that for 
thousands of years the size of human population was not constant but steadily 
increasing (Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). 
Furthermore, the size of population was increasing hyperbolically. The ―natural 
population growth‖ (growth rate) could not have been ―fluctuating around zero‖ 
but it must have been increasing hyperbolically because for the hyperbolic growth, 
the growth rate also increases hyperbolically (Nielsen, 2016h).  
6.8. The alleged roughly constant population 
In line with the accepted interpretations of the first stage of the Demographic 
Transition Theory, Lagerlöf writes:  
The Malthusian Regime in our model is a stable situation where death and 
birth rates are both high, and population roughly constant. Moreover, 
mortality is highly volatile, increasing dramatically in periods of big 
epidemic shocks. In periods with mild shocks population expands. This 
worsens the impact of the next epidemic, equilibrating population back to its 
Malthusian state (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 756. Italics added.).  
In our model, the world can thus be stuck in a Malthusian equilibrium for 
centuries and then suddenly escape, and never contract back. As suggested by 
a referee, this process could possibly be interpreted in terms of wars, instead 
of epidemics (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 766. Italics added.).  
Throughout human history, epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the 
growth path of population. Such shocks to mortality are the central theme of 
the model set up by Lagerlöf, which endogenously generates a long phase of 
stagnant population and living standards, followed by an industrial 
revolution and a demographic transition (Lagerlöf, 2003b, pp. 434, 435. 
Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. It is assumed that there was a Malthusian regime. 
2. It is assumed that Malthusian regime is characterised by high birth and 
death rates. 
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3. During the Malthusian regime population is roughly constant. 
4. Mortality is highly volatile. 
5. Mortality increases dramatically in periods of big epidemic shocks. 
6. Population expands when the mortality shocks are mild. 
7. Expanding population worsens the impact of the next epidemic and 
equilibrates population to the Malthusian state. 
8. Malthusian equilibrium lasts for centuries. 
9. The process of Malthusian equilibrium can be also explained by wars 
instead of epidemics. 
10. Throughout human history, epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the 
growth path of population. 
11. Model based on the assumption of shocks to mortality generates a long 
phase of stagnant population. 
12. The ―long phase of stagnant population and living standards‖ is ―followed 
by an industrial revolution and a demographic transition.‖ 
Here again, and quite typically, we have a series of declarations that have to be 
accepted by faith. However, paradoxically if not ironically, Lagerlöf was on the 
verge of discovering that doctrines accepted by faith were contradicted by his own 
model.  
He has carried out an interesting and important research work but unfortunately 
he did not finish it: he did not compare results of his calculations with data 
(Maddison, 2001), which were available to him before publication of his work. He 
did not take the final and the most essential step. If he did, he would have 
discovered that the mechanism of Malthusian stagnation incorporated in his model 
did not produce fluctuations in the model-generated growth of population, that 
model-generated growth of population was not stagnant and it did not fit the 
relevant data. He would have found that contrary to what he claims in his 
publication, his model generated population was not ―roughly constant.‖ If he 
cared to consult data (Maddison, 2001) he would have also found that the 
population reported by Maddison was also not ―roughly constant.‖ We shall 
discuss these issues in a separate publication.  
Lagerlöf presents a plot of the growth rate and calls it erroneously ―Population 
growth‖ (Lagerlöf, 2003b, p. 436). He fails to take the most essential step in this 
type of work and to use his model-generated growth rate to calculate model-
generated distribution describing the growth of population. He ignores data 
(Maddison, 2001) and yet his unfinished work is accepted for publication maybe 
because it proclaims loud and clear the doctrines of the established knowledge. 
Science appears to be of no importance.  
6.9.  Incorrect claims about the growth rate 
In our model, this leads to a constant rate of population growth prior to the 
adoption of the Solow technology. This result is consistent with population 
data from Michael Kremer (1993), where the growth rate of population 
fluctuates around a small constant throughout most of the Malthusian period 
(from 4000 B.C. to A.D. 1650) (Hansen & Prescott (2002), p. 1205. Italics 
added.). 
Claims: 
1. Growth rate of population fluctuates around small constant during the 
Malthusian period (i.e. prior to the adoption of Solow technology). 
2. Small and roughly constant growth rate is consistent with population data 
from Michael Kremer (1993). 
First, it appears that Hansen and Prescott might be confusing constant growth 
rate with constant population. It might be the same mistake as it appears to have 
been made by Lagerlöf (2003b). A constant (non-zero) growth rate does not 
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produce a constant (non-zero) size of population. A constant (non-zero) growth rate 
produces exponential growth.   
Second, this declaration appears to contain conflicting information. It is hard to 
imagine that random forces characterising the mythical Malthusian period would 
produce a steadily increasing exponential growth. Steadily-increasing growth 
suggests the presence of a dominating constant force, overruling any random 
forces.   
Third, fluctuations in the growth rate are not readily reflected as fluctuations in 
the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016c). We can demonstrate it even without 
carrying mathematical analysis of the fluctuating growth rate. Data alone 
(Lehmeyer, 2004; Mauritius, 2015; Statistics Mauritius, 2014; Statistics Sweden, 
1999; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981) show clearly that fluctuating growth rates do not 
produce significant fluctuations in the growth of population and that they have no 
impact on the mechanism of growth because they do not alter growth trajectories.   
Fourth, we would have to show convincingly that the growth rate was indeed 
fluctuating around a small constant value as claimed by Hansen & Prescott (2002). 
There is no such proof because we do not have the data for the growth rate 
extending over thousands of years. However, there is a proof that the growth rate 
during the AD and BC eras was not fluctuating around a small constant value but 
that it was increasing hyperbolically because the growth of the population was 
hyperbolic (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). 
For the hyperbolic growth, the growth rate increases hyperbolically with time or in 
the direct proportion to the size of population (Nielsen, 2016h), as observed also by 
Kremer (1993). 
Fifth, Kremer (1963) did not carry out an extensive study of the growth rate. He 
has presented rough calculations of this quantity using strongly varying local 
gradients, which do not represent the real gradient of growth. His calculations are 
strongly inaccurate for the BC era when individual data values are separated by 
large time intervals. It is scientifically unjustifiable to use such calculations and 
claim fluctuations around a constant value. 
Sixth, for the hyperbolic growth, growth rate is small over a long time because it 
is also hyperbolic. Growth rate might appear to vary around a small constant but 
such interpretation is incorrect. Growth rate should be preferably calculated using 
interpolated gradients to avoid spurious effects of strongly-varying local gradients 
between adjacent data values. It is also useful to display growth rate using various 
types of displays to help in its interpretation. Using the approximate calculations of 
Kremer (1963) and claiming that growth rate was varying around small constant is 
self-misleading and scientifically unjustified. 
This example illustrates that in science it is essential to carry out methodical 
analysis of data. In economic and demographic research this is particularly 
important because historical economic growth and historical growth of population 
were increasing hyperbolically. Hyperbolic distributions are strongly misleading 
and can easily lead to their misinterpretations. Furthermore, for hyperbolic 
distributions, the growth rate and the gradient increase in a similar fashion. The 
growth rate increases hyperbolically and the gradient follows the second-order 
hyperbolic distribution, both of them containing the same confusing features of a 
slow growth over a long time and a fast growth over a short time, but both 
increasing monotonically over the entire range of time. Hyperbolic growth of the 
GDP and population as well the monotonically-increasing growth rates and 
gradients cannot be divided into two or three distinctly different sections. They all 
have to be analysed and interpreted as a whole. The same mechanism has to be 
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applied to the slow and to the fast growth because slow and fast growth belongs to 
the same, monotonically-increasing distributions.   
6.10. The alleged density-dependent variations in mortality  
If population density increases the mortality rate rises, equilibrating 
population back to the Malthusian trap (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 765. Italics 
added.).  
This statement has to be also accepted by faith because there is no convincing 
research supporting such declaration. Creative imagination appears to be taking full 
control in the established knowledge.  
Here we have an example of an interesting detail added to the concept of the 
epoch of Malthusian stagnation, illustrating how one fantasy can lead easily to a 
new fantasy and how such gradual additions reinforce the established knowledge. 
This statement claims the dependence of mortality rate on the density of human 
population. It offers an explanation how the phantom Malthusian trap regulates the 
growth of human population. It describes some kind of a general rule that the 
Malthusian trap is activated when the population density, not its size, reaches a 
certain limiting value.  
There is no research confirming the described mechanism; no research showing 
how the growth of human population depends on its density. Even if we could 
show some isolated examples of the density-dependent growth we would have to 
demonstrate that such mechanism applies also to regional and global populations. 
The best data available to us show the time-dependence of the size of human 
population and there is nothing in them to suggest any form of density-dependence, 
let alone the existence of the Malthusian trap triggered by the density of 
population. 
This statement is yet another example of the leaps of faith, of confident 
declarations requiring a huge amount of work to be accepted as a reliable 
contribution to science. The descriptions of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation are 
full of such unscientific declarations. Indeed, they are made of them.       
Other terms used to describe the alleged stagnant and fluctuating state of growth 
during this mythical epoch of Malthusian stagnation are ―equilibrium trap‖ or 
―population trap‖ (Leibenstein, 1957; Nelson, 1956), ―multiple equilibria‖ or 
―poverty trap‖ (Wang, 2005).  
The belief in the stagnant and fluctuating growth is so strong that mathematical 
models are deemed successful if they can generate the desired oscillations during 
this mythical epoch of Malthusian stagnation, and no-one seems to care to take the 
next and the most essential step and to compare model calculations with population 
data. As long as oscillations of some kind are generated by a mathematical model, 
they are taken as the proof of the existence of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation. 
This line of reasoning shows that the primary, if not the exclusive, aim of such 
mathematical exercises is to translate a story into a mathematical language and 
when the translation is done properly, when mathematical formulae generate any 
kind of oscillations, large or small, significant or negligible, these formulae are 
then taken as a proof of the existence of Malthusian stagnation.   
6.11. The alleged Age of Pestilence and Famine 
The epoch of Malthusian stagnation is also described as the Age of Pestilence 
and Famine (Omran 1971; 1983; 1998).  
In this stage, the major determinants of death are the Malthusian positive 
checks, namely epidemics, famines and wars (Omran, 1983, p. 306; Omran, 
2005, p. 737).   
Even if fertility approached its biologic maximum, depopulation could and 
did occur as a result of epidemics, wars and famines, which repeatedly 
pushed mortality levels to high peaks (Omran, 2005, p. 733). 
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The pattern of growth [of human population] until about 1650 is cyclic 
(Omran, 1971, Table 4, p. 533).  
Claims: 
1. During the Age of Pestilence and Famine (i.e. during the epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation) major determinants of death are the Malthusian 
positive checks (epidemics, famines and wars). 
2. Depopulation was occurring even when fertility was approaching its 
biological maximum because epidemics, wars and famines were repeatedly 
pushing mortality levels to high peaks. 
3. Growth of population before AD 1650 was cyclic. 
To justify the first claim we would have to have reliable records of the causes of 
death over thousands of years.  We would then have to show convincingly that 
indeed the major causes of death were epidemics, famines and wars. We would 
also have to show that there was a clear change in the causes of death when the 
epoch of Malthusian stagnation ceased to exist. We cannot present such proofs 
because we do not have the supporting data. In principle, therefore, this claim is 
not scientific because we cannot check it by data. It has to be accepted by faith. 
To justify the second claim, we would have to have reliable records of fertility 
and mortality over thousands of years. We would then have to demonstrate that 
fertility was approaching biological limits, that such events were coinciding with 
high mortality peaks and that these high mortality peaks were caused by epidemics, 
wars and famines. We do not have relevant data to check whether these 
descriptions are true. They are therefore also unscientific and they have to be 
accepted by faith.  
The growth of population, global and regional, before AD 1650 was not cyclic 
(Nielsen, 2016b, 2016d). This statement is contradicted by data (Biraben, 1980; 
Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 
1997; Maddison, 2001; 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999; 2013). 
6.12. The alleged main cause of mortality 
During the first stage, mortality vacillated at high levels, with infectious 
disease as the main cause of death plus a large proportion due to wars and 
famines (Robine, 2001, p. 191. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. During the first stage of demographic transitions mortality vacillated at high 
levels. 
2. The main causes of death were infectious diseases. 
3. Large proportion of death were caused by wars and famines. 
We cannot prove that ―mortality vacillated at high levels‖ because we have no 
relevant data for the so-called ―first stage‖ to carry out such a study, the stage that 
is assumed to have lasted for thousands of years. We cannot prove that these 
imagined and wished-for vacillations were correlated with infectious disease, wars 
and famines. We cannot prove that the main causes of deaths were infectious 
diseases. We cannot prove that a large proportion of death was due to wars and 
famines. We do not have sufficiently extensive records of causes of death 
extending over thousands of years. We do not know how the causes of death were 
changing over time. We do not have the records to help us to distinguish between 
the major and minor causes. We do not know whether the main cause of death was 
the same over thousands of years. The concept of the epoch of Malthusian 
Stagnation and all these claims have to be accepted by faith.  
6.13. The alleged unsustained growth of population 
The first transition phase, called the ‗Age of Pestilence and Famine,‘ is 
characterized by high and fluctuating mortality rates, variable life expectancy 
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with low average life span, and periods of population growth that are not 
sustained (McKeown, 2009, p. 20S. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. During the Age of Pestilence and Famine (i.e. during the hypothetical but 
non-existent epoch of Malthusian stagnation) mortality rates were high and 
fluctuating. 
2. Average life span was low. 
3. There were periods when the population growth was not sustained. 
Mortality rates might have been high and fluctuating but we have no data 
extending over thousands of years to prove it. Furthermore, we would yet have to 
show that these hypothetical high and fluctuating mortality rates could have been 
responsible for creating stagnation. What we know is that strongly-fluctuating 
mortality rates do not change the growth of population (Lehmeyer, 2004; 
Mauritius, 2015; Nielsen, 2016c; Statistics Mauritius, 2014; Statistics Sweden, 
1999; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981). There is also nothing in the data and in their 
analysis to show that ―low average life span‖ was affecting the growth of 
population. As for the ―periods of population growth that are not sustained‖ this 
claim is contradicted by the analysis of data (Nielsen, 2016b; 2016d). 
6.14. Positive forces were allegedly balanced by negative forces 
The positive forces of growth had existed all along. However, they had been 
counterbalanced by the negative forces of malnutrition and disease (Komlos 
& Baten, 2003, p. 19).  
We have no reliable empirical evidence to support this claim, no study of 
positive and negative forces, no study of their balancing, and no study of their 
influence on the growth of human population. This is not science but story-writing 
prompted and approved by the established knowledge.  
How do we know that the so-called positive forces were balanced by forces of 
malnutrition and disease? They obviously were not because economic growth and 
the growth of population were hyperbolic and remarkably stable (Nielsen, 2016a, 
2016b, 2016d). Such a strong and stable growth could have been only generated by 
a strong and dominating force.  
Here again, authors of this declaration take an easy way out. They have made 
no attempt to consult data available to them at the time of the publication of their 
paper (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 
1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & 
Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999). 
They have made no attempt to reconcile their interpretations with the already 
documented evidence of hyperbolic growth (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, Mora & 
Amiot, 1960). Again, this declaration is in perfect agreement with the established 
knowledge but is in conflict with science. 
6.15. The continuing misinformation 
The established knowledge is by now so strongly established that it will be 
difficult to change it. It continues to be supported by the scientifically-
unsubstantiated claims and descriptions. It would take volumes to list and discuss 
all such examples and to show that these repeatedly propagated doctrines, 
explanations and interpretations have to be accepted by faith.  
The current established knowledge based on the assumption of Malthusian 
stagnation followed by explosion and reinforced by many complicated 
explanations is similar to the established knowledge about the dynamics of celestial 
bodies, interpretations which were established for about two millennia before they 
were eventually abandoned. Describing the work of mathematicians of his time, 
Osiander wrote: 
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With them it is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other 
members from his images from divers models, each part excellently drawn, but 
not related to a single body, and since they in no way match each other, the result 
would be monster rather than man (Copernicus, 1995).
1
 
Historical economic growth and historical growth of population can be expected 
to be described by a simple mechanism because hyperbolic growth is simple. This 
issue will be discussed in a separate publication, where a simple explanation of the 
mechanism of hyperbolic growth will be also presented. Hyperbolic growth 
prevailed for at least 12,000 years for the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d) 
and for hundreds of years for the economic growth (Nielsen, 2016a). The 
established knowledge in demography and in economic research offers 
complicated explanations, which have to be accepted by faith. Hopefully we shall 
not have to wait for two thousand years to abandon these erroneous doctrines and 
replace them by science.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
Established knowledge in demography and in economic research is based on a 
series of doctrines and explanations revolving around the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation and around the concept of the escape from the Malthusian trap described 
as explosion, takeoff, sprint or spurt. It is a system of interpretations, which have to 
be accepted by faith.  
It is easy to understand why these concepts are so attractive because the growth 
of population and economic growth were increasing hyperbolically and hyperbolic 
growth creates an illusion of stagnation followed by explosion.  
It is essential to understand that hyperbolic distributions should be analysed and 
interpreted as a whole. If we take just a few examples along the hyperbolic growth, 
we can easily make a mistake and arrive at incorrect conclusions. If hyperbolic 
distributions are already difficult to understand without their methodical analysis, 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015a) describing income per 
capita are even more difficult to understand because they create even stronger 
illusion of stagnation followed by a sudden explosion. Here again, just taking a few 
examples along these distributions is bound to lead to incorrect conclusions. These 
distributions have to be also analysed with care. Careful and methodical 
mathematical analysis of data describing historical economic growth and the 
growth of population is unavoidable.  
Distributions describing income per capita are generated by a division of two 
hyperbolic distributions. The characteristic feature of this ratio is that for a long 
time the growth of income per capita was not just slow, as for hyperbolic 
distributions, but nearly constant. This feature characterises the division of any 
hyperbolic distributions, not just the division of the GDP and population (Nielsen, 
2015a). It is a purely mathematical property, which has nothing to do with specific 
properties of economic growth,  
The nearly constant income per capita should never be interpreted automatically 
as stagnation. The only way to claim stagnation for this nearly-constant income per 
capita is to analyse the GDP and population data separately and to prove that these 
distributions are not hyperbolic but stagnant.  
 
1
 This quotation comes from a letter written by Andreas Osiander, Lutheran theologian and a friend of 
Copernicus, a letter addressed to the chief editor, Pope Paul III. Osiander argues in favour of the 
mathematically simple and elegant heliocentric system as opposed to the complicated geocentric 
descriptions. This letter was later used as an unsigned introduction to the book De revolutionibus 
orbium coelestium, and was mistakenly attributed to Copernicus.  
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It is incorrect to take a few values of income per capita, show that they are 
nearly constant and claim stagnation. If the GDP and population increase 
hyperbolically, then income per capita increases by following the monotonically-
increasing linearly-modulated hyperbolic destitution and it is incorrect to try to 
divide such a monotonically-increasing distribution into two different sections, 
slow and fast. Mathematically, it is impossible to make such a division. It is 
impossible to identify a point or a range of points and claim them as marking the 
place of transition.  
Even though the ratio of two hyperbolic distributions is nearly constant over a 
long time and nearly vertical over a short time, the transition from the nearly 
constant to the nearly vertical patterns occurs all the time along the entire range of 
such distributions. Linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions representing 
income per capita should be also interpreted as a whole. The same mechanism 
should be applied to the nearly constant and to the nearly vertical growth, unless 
we can prove that the GDP and population were not following hyperbolic 
distributions but were stagnant.  
We have presented many examples of claims revolving around the concepts of 
stagnation followed by explosion. We have shown why such claims are 
scientifically unacceptable.  
The origin of the fundamental concepts of the established knowledge can be 
traced, perhaps not entirely correctly, to Malthus (1798). He has presented an 
important pioneering work but unfortunately the ensuing studies of economic 
growth and of the growth of population have taken a wrong turn at a certain time in 
the past, perhaps because relevant data were not available.  
By the time the relevant data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 
1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001; 2010; 
McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 
1994; United Nations, 1973; 1999) became available, they were ignored. More 
recently, some of them (Maddison, 2001) were manipulated to support the 
established knowledge (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 
2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 
2008). Earlier analyses of data (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) 
showing that the growth of population was hyperbolic were also ignored. By now, 
the established knowledge is so well established that anything being in its conflict 
is methodically ignored, rejected or suppressed. This is not science.  
Recent analyses of data (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016d; 2016e; 
2016f; 2016g; 2016h; 2016i) confirmed the earlier studies (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 
1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Hoerner, 1975; von Foerster, 
Mora & Amiot, 1960) and demonstrated that the historical growth of population 
and the historical economic growth were hyperbolic. The established knowledge 
based on the scientifically-contradicted concepts of stagnation followed by 
explosion (takeoff or the escape from the Malthusian trap) has to be replaced by 
explanations based on accepting hyperbolic growth.   
It is incorrect to interpret the past harsh living conditions as a proof of the 
existence of Malthusian stagnation. Whatever harsh living conditions might have 
been present in the past, their effects are generally not reflected in growth 
trajectories. The only known example is for the growth of global population 
between AD 1200 and 1400 coinciding with the convergence of five major 
demographic catastrophes (Nielsen, 2016d). However, even then, the recorded 
effect is small.  
Negative effects of the Malthusian positive checks should be never used 
robotically to describe the past growth of population or the economic growth. If we 
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want to claim that positive checks were shaping the growth of population or 
economic growth, we have to prove it. If we want to claim that the so-called Law 
of Population was shaping growth trajectories, we have to prove it. If we want to 
claims that demographic catastrophes were shaping the growth of population, we 
have to prove it. If we want to claim that Industrial Revolution was shaping growth 
trajectories, we have to prove it. We cannot take shelter in the established 
knowledge because in this respect established knowledge is repeatedly contradicted 
by data. Any data we might have, should to be methodically analysed to prove the 
negative effects of Malthusian positive checks but whatever we would prove would 
be just an exception from the general and well-demonstrated pattern that the 
historical growth of population and historical economic growth were not only 
hyperbolic but that they also remarkably stable.  
Interpretations based on the concepts of Malthusian stagnation and on the claims of 
the escape from the Malthusian trap are not only incorrect but also dangerously 
misleading. They suggest that after the endless epoch of stagnation we have now 
entered the sustained growth regime (Galor, 2005a; 2011). This hypothesis creates 
a sense of security. In contrast, analysis of data shows that the past growth was 
sustainable but now for the first time in human history it is unsustainable and 
insecure (Nielsen, 2015b). While in the past, economic growth and the growth of 
population, global and regional, were following the slowly increasing hyperbolic 
trajectories (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 
2016h; 2016i) indicating the unconstrained and secure growth, now the growth is at 
the stage of the dangerously fast increase (see Figures 1 and 2). The growth is no 
longer hyperbolic but the current growth increases close to the historical hyperbolic 
trajectories. For the first time in human history, these growth trajectories are clearly 
unsustainable because such a fast increase cannot be possibly tolerated for much 
longer. 
The established knowledge is not only in conflict with data describing the past 
economic growth and the growth of human population but also in conflict with the 
general knowledge about the current mounting problems threatening our future. 
The established knowledge in demography and in economic research created its 
own world of fiction divorced from the real world.  
We have not escaped the Malthusian trap because there was no trap in the 
economic growth or in the growth of population. The past growth was 
unconstrained and sustainable as demonstrated by the undisturbed hyperbolic 
distributions. However, now we are in the trap. For the first time in human history 
we are in the trap of numerous critical problems, which threaten our global security 
and our survival (Nielsen, 2006). For the first time in human history our combined 
ecological footprint is larger than the ecological capacity and it continues to 
increase (WWF, 2010). For the first time in human history our growth is supported 
by the increasing ecological deficit.  
In order to understand the past and present economic growth, erroneous 
interpretations revolving around the concept of Malthusian stagnation have to be 
abandoned and replaced by scientifically acceptable interpretations. What needs to 
be explained is why the past economic growth and the growth of population were 
hyperbolic. Why was the growth so remarkably stable? Why was it not influenced 
by many random forces, which might have been present? Why did the growth start 
to divert to slower trajectories? Why does it continue so closely to the dangerously 
fast hyperbolic trajectories? And the most important questions of all: How to slow 
down the current growth? How to control growth? 
Examples presented here suggest that there is a problem not just with certain 
interpretations adopted and protected by the established knowledge in the 
demographic and economic research but with the way research is carried out in 
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these two fields. It is not just the problem with one or two theories, such as the 
Demographic Transition Theory or the Unified Growth Theory, which need to be 
corrected or most likely replaced. It is not even just the problem with the accepted 
paradigm based on the concept of Malthusian stagnation, which needs to be 
abandoned. It is a systemic problem. It is a problem, with the way research is 
conducted in these two fields. It is a problem with creating stories and 
interpretations, which have to be accepted by faith. It is a problem with a selective 
use of data. It is a problem of ignoring contradicting evidence, such as the 
contradicting evidence published over 50 years ago by von Foerster, Mora and 
Amiot (1960). It is problem with manipulating and distorting data to fit the 
preconceived ideas, as it has been done repeatedly in the Unified Growth Theory 
and in other related publications (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 
2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon 
& Galor, 2008). It is a problem of testing data by a theory rather than testing theory 
by data. It is a problem with protecting a system of doctrines, which are accepted 
on faith.   
As outlined briefly elsewhere (Nielsen, 2016i), there are two ways of 
conducting research: (1) the dynamic scientific method, which is used in the self-
correcting disciplines of science and (2) the stale method, which is used routinely 
in the usually emotional and dishonest defence of doctrines accepted by faith. It is 
unfortunate, that as pointed out earlier (Nielsen 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014; 2015a; 
2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h; 2016i), demographic 
and economic research appears to gravitate strongly towards the unscientific 
method. 
The established knowledge revolving around the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation has to be changed because there was no stagnation in the historical 
economic growth and in the historical growth of population. There was also no 
escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no trap. This paradigm has to 
be changed because historical economic growth and the historical growth of 
population were hyperbolic. However, in order to make the demographic and 
economic research scientifically acceptable, the systemic problem has to be also 
solved. Scientific research can be based only on the well-known and generally 
recognised scientific rules of investigation. Anything else is not science.   
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